Monad with Neocortex. Ethics and Neuroscience in International Intercultural Collaborative Work

This paper approaches neuroscience in a dialogue with philosophy through ethics and axiology. We have structured a methodology of work in groups for the creation of video games whose performance is made by assuming that a designer must be trained in the face of extreme problems that strain all his or her neural capacity. The best way to achieve this is to face ethical dilemmas. It is because of the strength of philosophy and applied science’s findings that we sustain the importance of this proposal. The objective is to lay the foundations for a debate on the meaning of curricula and design methodologies, before a world that faces axiological problems in all the critical aspects of its current situation.

The experience in which we implemented this methodological approach has been that of distance international collaborative spaces with the participation of students from Germany (Harz University of Applied Sciences), Japan (Technology University of Tokyo), and Mexico (UNAM´s Faculty of Arts and Design) for the creation of video games. 

BACKGROUND: EMPATHY, ETHICS AND NEUROSCIENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY DIALOGUE
Pioneering studies in neuroscience have identified key brain structures for empathy, such as the prefrontal cortex, anterior insula, and mirror neurons, discovered in primates by Giacomo Rizzolatti. These neurons, according to Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2006), “allow us to simulate the actions and emotions of others, creating a biological basis for empathy.” Oxytocin, referred to by Paul Zak (2012) as a “moral glue,” reinforces prosocial behaviors by modulating trust and emotional connection. Neuroimaging experiments such as those of Tania Singer reveal that observing the pain of others activates areas such as the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex, identical to those involved in one’s own pain (Singer et al., 2004), suggesting a shared neural basis between personal experience and empathy. 

Empathy is not only a neurobiological phenomenon, but also a phenomenon of consciousness widely studied by philosophy, economics, religion, and art. Carol Gilligan (1982) proposed that ethics of care arises from concrete empathic responses. Michael Slote (2007) expands on this idea by arguing that “empathy is at the core of moral evaluation, as it allows us to perceive the impact of our actions on others.” However, neuroscience also exposes internal tensions in morality: Joshua Greene showed that, in the tram dilemmas and the like, utilitarian (rational) decisions activate the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, while those based on empathy mobilize emotional regions such as the amygdala (Greene et al., 2001). 

Pathologies associated with empathic deficits offer critical insights. In psychopaths, dysfunction in the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex explains their lack of remorse (Blair, 2005), while in autism differences in theory of mind are linked to the connectivity of the superior temporal cortex (Baron-Cohen, 1997). 

NOTION OF “ADAMIC TIME” PRECEDES AS AN IDEA OF AN INNATE OR PRIMAL EQUITY FROM PHILOSOPHY TO BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL FINDINGS

THE LIMITS OF EMPATHY
These findings raise uncomfortable ethical questions, as Walter Glannon (2011) points out: “To what extent does moral responsibility depend on an intact biology?” Patricia Churchland (2011) suggests that neuroscience forces us to rethink concepts such as freewill and guilt, challenging traditional notions of moral agency. However, empathy is not infallible. Jean Decety showed that it is more intense towards the ingroup, having a lesser activation 1of the insula before the suffering of the outgroup (Decety & Cowell, 2014), which, according to Paul Bloom (2016), “can perpetuate prejudices, contradicting its supposed universalist role.” In addition, chronic exposure to the pain of others induces empathic fatigue, linked to the desensitization of neural circuits (Klimecki et al., 2013), a phenomenon that Jesse Prinz (2011) summarizes: “More empathy is not always better.” 

In practical applications, neuroscience of empathy informs everything, from the design of ethical artificial intelligence (AI) to public policy. Wallach & Allen (2009) underline its relevance for creating bias-free algorithms, while Thaler and Sunstein (2008) propose “empathy-based nudges to foster cooperation”. Studies on the behavior of infants such as those of Paul Bloom (2013) support the idea of a “primal morality” (Haidt, 2012), suggesting that fairness could be innate. 

As we can see, debate is open and in the process of becoming more complex. As Patricia Churchland (2011) argues, “neuroscience does not reduce morality to biology, but it does reveal how our brain circuits shape what we consider ‘good’ or ‘bad’”. However, Martha Nussbaum (2013) warns that “empathy must be complemented with critical judgment to avoid its biases.” This dialogue between the biological and the normative shows the need for philosophy and its findings. For example, addressing the primal morality previously mentioned, Walter Benjamin’s notion of “Adamic time” precedes as an idea of an innate or primal equity from philosophy to biopsychosocial findings. Max Scheler’s monumental work Essence and Forms of Sympathy; the work of Emmanuel Levinas and his idea of ility (being affected by others who supposedly do not concern us) are fundamental to avoid a tendency towards neuromania or biological reductionism, blind to axiology as a human phenomenon. 

POPPER AND THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NEUROSCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
Karl Popper’s work, renowned for his critique of inductivism and his defense of falsifiability, transcends epistemology to address fundamental problems in the relationship between mind, brain, and culture. His collaboration with neurophysiologist John Eccles on The Self and Its Brain (1977) not only synthesizes philosophy and neuroscience but offers an ontological framework—the theory of the three worlds—for questioning materialist reductionism and promoting interdisciplinary dialogue. The conceptual bridge between applied neuroscientific research and philosophical reflection is explored, and their ideas remain relevant in contemporary debates. 

They propose a tripartite ontology to explain reality: 

The dynamic interaction between these worlds explains, for example, how a scientific hypothesis (World 3) motivates brain experiments (World 1) through the mind of a researcher (World 2). This model rejects the reductionist materialism that Popper describes as a “categorical error” by equating mental processes with neural activity.

ALTHOUGH THE BRAIN IS THE SUBSTRATE OF THE MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS AND CULTURE OPERATE IN REGISTERS THAT EXCEED THE BIOLOGICAL

NEUROSCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY: CRITICIZING REDUCTIONISM
Popper questions the tendency to reduce the mind to neural correlates, a position that Bennett and Hacker (2003) consider a mereological fallacy: attributing mental qualities to parts of the brain (e.g. “the amygdala is afraid”). For Popper, this ignores the fact that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon that requires a different explanatory framework: “The claim to reduce the mind to physical processes is a categorical error. Consciousness is not a substance, but neither is it an illusion” (Popper & Eccles, 1977). 

Eccles complements this vision from neurobiology by proposing that the cerebral cortex acts as a “detector-amplifier” of the mind, a model that suggests interaction without falling into radical dualisms. This idea anticipates current debates on the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996), where the subjective resists purely physical explanations. 

The collaboration between Popper and Eccles exemplifies how philosophy can accompany neuroscience on its way to more rigorous questions. For example, Popper’s critical rationalism demands that neuroscientific theories be falsifiable and avoid dogmatism. This is crucial for statements such as “free will is an illusion,” which Popper would reject for its implicit determinism: “If physical determinism were true, there would be no room for human creativity and moral responsibility” (Popper & Eccles, 1977). Popper not only provided a framework for the critic of non-falsifiable theories but also outlined an ontology that respects human complexity. His theory of the three worlds invites neuroscience to recognize that, although the brain is the substrate of the mind, consciousness and culture operate in registers that exceed the biological. In an era dominated by big data and AI, his legacy reminds us that all applied science must dialogue with philosophy to avoid reductionism and enrich its understanding of reality. 

THE RELATION BETWEEN HUSSERL’S “MONAD WITH WINDOWS” AND LEIBNIZ’S MONAD: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL REINTERPRETATION
Edmund Husserl’s philosophy takes up Gottfried Leibniz’s concept of the “monad,” radically transforming it to solve problems such as intersubjectivity and temporality. Although both thinkers share the idea of the monad as an active and irreducible unity, their approaches diverge in fundamental respects. 

For Leibniz, monads are “simple substances without windows, through which something can enter or exit” (Monadology, 1714, §7), which implies a metaphysical isolation resolved through a “pre-established harmony” by God. This theological framework hierarchizes the monads by placing God as the supreme substance. Husserl strips the concept of its theological dimension and integrates it into his transcendental phenomenology. His monad is not a closed substance, but a “concrete structure of consciousness” that includes his temporal history and his intersubjective openness (Cartesian Meditations, 1929). By stating that monads “have windows,” Husserl rejects solipsism: intermonadicity permits a “community of transcendental egos” that constitute an objective world through intentional acts (Crisis of European Sciences, 1954). This opening is not causal, but phenomenal: “The other is not given as an object, but as an alter ego in my primordial sphere” (Cartesian Meditations). Husserl introduces a historical dimension absent in Leibniz: identity is constructed through passive (habits) and active (decisions) syntheses, not through a predetermined program. Husserl’s critique of the Leibnizian “absolute” is key: the world does not exist independently of consciousness but is “an achievement of intersubjectivity” (Crisis…, 1954). Husserl, therefore, makes a critical reception of Leibniz: he maintains the monad as an active unit, but redefines it as an intentional and temporal structure. While Leibniz resorts to God for harmony, Husserl bases objectivity on intersubjectivity, 2the communication of consciousnesses, opening the monads to a shared world. 

HOSPITALITY AS THE FIRST UNIVERSITY IN HISTORY
Ryszard Kapuściński’s reflection on hospitality as a “first university”—an ancestral mechanism of cultural exchange—acquires depth when linked to neuroscientific findings. It is a fact that brain regions such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), associated with empathy and social cognition, biologically support the dynamics described by the author. 

The vmPFC, key in moral decision-making and emotional regulation (Damasio, 1994), would have allowed ancient societies to evaluate risks and benefits when welcoming travelers. Kapuściński (2008) points out that hospitality emerged as an “ethical and strategic act;” a balance between fear of the unknown and curiosity about their knowledge. The vmPFC, linked to emotional empathy, facilitated the generosity necessary to integrate the Other, while the TPJ, essential for the theory of mind (Decety & Lamm, 2006), made it possible to infer the intentions of travelers and adapt to their narratives. 

Kapuściński (2007) describes travelers as “moving libraries” that transmitted geographical or philosophical knowledge. Neuroscientifically, this exchange required activating TPJ to “map” other people’s perspectives, a process that enriched the symbolic imagination of the receiving communities. As Emmanuel Lévinas (1969) states, the encounter with the Other is a “primordial ethical event,” an idea that is neurobiologically anchored in the capacity of the vmPFC and the TPJ to translate otherness into learning. 

CULTURAL EVOLUTION AND BRAIN PLASTICITY
Repeated exposure to interactions with outsiders was able to evolutionarily shape these networks. Societies with intense cultural flows, such as trade routes, developed complex institutions by stimulating circuits of cooperation (vmPFC) and cultural decoding (TPJ). In contrast, isolation activates the amygdala, the center of fear, inhibiting empathy. Kapuściński (2008) warns that closed societies “stagnate in ignorance,” a statement consistent with studies that link social diversity with innovation (Henrich, 2015). Today, these regions remain crucial to face challenges such as migration. Hospitality, as an “antidote to xenophobia” (Kapuściński, 2007), can be seen as a dialectical exercise between our attitudes, our neural capacities and our culture. Just as hospitality depends on maintaining active circuits that promote cognitive flexibility (vmPFC) and narrative integration (TPJ), these same circuits depend, to a large extent, on the environment around us and our will. From the neuroscience point of view, this explains why intercultural dialogue reduces prejudice: by exercising theory of mind, the amygdalar response to the “stranger” is weakened. Socially, intersubjective interaction strengthens the social fabric and expands it. 

 
THE MONAD WITH NEOCORTEX
In the light of the dialogue between philosophy and neuroscience, we can imagine consciousness as a monad, but not subject to a teleology (Leibnitz) or simply “with windows” (Husserl), but with a sense towards the other (Levinas, Kapuściński), with an ethical sense (Scheler). Evidently, the monad with neocortex, more than a scientific category, is an invitation to delve into the disturbing relationship between two facts that seem, incredibly, to run parallel: phenomenon 1, the biological characteristic that seems aligned with, phenomenon 2, subjective attitudes such as collaboration, compassion, empathy. This would allow us to propose that Popper’s three worlds are not only three ontological spheres but also have an axiological foundation. If it has been shown that language as a function operates from the gyrus known as Broca’s area, and at the same time, as a communicational structure between subjects, is affected by culture and will, then we can say that empathy that operates from vmPFC and TPJ as a relational structure between subjects is also affected by culture and will. 

GRAPHIC DESIGN METHODOLOGY BASED ON ETHICAL DILEMMAS
I think it is relevant to address teaching-learning processes through aspects related to the social subject that develops in the three worlds proposed by Popper. These three worlds have an axiological “gravitational force” that is intensified in the radical experience towards what is different. We can say that the subject is biologically abled for social and community encounter. Failing to address the ethical character of human interaction is failing in the centrality of the means and ends of social action and pedagogy. 

In the experimental methodology described here, I have assumed the position proposed by Kapuściński: that the first university was hospitality. That is to say, the epistemological and gnoseological act par excellence is the encounter with the Other, a receptive, hospitable encounter that privileges the person over the end. Or as Max Scheler puts it, the person as an end and not as a means: “The person is not an object among objects, but the center of acts that possess themselves in their spiritual being, and in this sense, it is the supreme value that does not admit subordination to external ends.”

This is extremely challenging for those of us participating in working groups of creative people for videogame development, specifically in synchronous and asynchronous contexts, with differing time zones and in virtual environments. Nor is it only the geographical and temporal challenge, but the systemic one of a world increasingly focused on efficiency for efficiency’s sake. The methodology was used for the first time during the pandemic in a project of videogames development with several international universities. My role as a mentor of students from different countries led me to open reflection on the uncertainty of health confinement, and on the possibility of the project’s cancellation. I described the process in UNAM International 1 (February-May, 2022, https://revista.unaminternacional.unam.mx/nota/1), if readers wish to know more about it. 

The results of that experience transcended the academic: an international community was forged, united by fraternal ties, something that the coordinators attribute to the “power to create from shared vulnerability.” 

The success of the method was verified in the fact that the team working with it was the only one that did not register dropouts during the pandemic, which proves that, as Aristotle said, the most natural human desire is to know. I would add: to know about problems that concern us all. 

We are currently developing a new version of the method in an ongoing project with students from Germany, Japan, and Mexico, following the methodology known as International Collaborative Online Learning (COIL). We have divided the process into three moments: a) genesis of the concept (where the ethical-methodological principle is strongly developed); b) creation of teams for the technical work of adapting the concept to the game engine, and c) user experience and interface design phase. I coordinate the first moment; the second corresponds to Professor Dominik Wilhelm, and the third to Professor Koji Mikami. We hope to be able to report results soon through UNAM International magazine’s blog.

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